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Magic Mirror on the Wall, who in the World is Legitimate After 
All? Legitimacy Claims of International Institutions 
ABSTRACT 
The legitimacy of international institutions is a contested issue both in terms of concept 
formation and empirical evidence and attracts attention from across the political scienc-
es. The present contribution posits a relational concept of legitimacy that includes self-
justification of rulers on the one hand, and legitimacy beliefs of the ruled on the other 
hand. By taking a top-down perspective, our conceptual section explores an underde-
veloped aspect in the field of legitimacy research. We posit that the analysis of political 
elites’ self-legitimations can considerably contribute to our understanding of governing 
activities and provide a more thorough picture of legitimation processes. These practices 
play a key role in transforming mere power into popularly accepted, stable authority and 
have an essentially communicative nature. Hence, self-legitimations are amenable to 
discourse analysis. In this conjunction, the paper assumes that the media functions as a 
discursive battleground creating a space for positive or negative evaluations of political 
orders, including affirmative contributions of the representatives of challenged organi-
zations themselves. The conceptual and theoretical link between legitimacy, self-
legitimizing practices, and discourse analysis is further developed in the first section of 
the paper. 
Subsequently, our conceptualization of self-legitimizing practices is empirically ex-
emplified. Our explorative study of self-legitimating statements of representatives of 
three major international institutions (EU, G8, and UN) in media discourses is based on 
a large qualitative data-set which analyzes legitimacy discourses in two high-quality 
newspapers in four Western democracies (GB, US, DE, and CH) over a period of ten 
years (1998-2007). Our empirical findings demonstrate that international institutions’ 
formal representatives and member states actively take part in the process of legitima-
tion. Hence, global governance arrangements are not only objects of legitimacy de-
mands, but at the same time cultivators of their own legitimacy.  
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Magic Mirror on the Wall, who in the World is Legitimate After 
All? Legitimacy Claims of International Institutions 
1. INTRODUCTION1 
“When one turns from generalization about rulers to consideration of individual cases, 
one is struck by the observation that the urge to possess and exercise power is usually 
qualified by concern about the justification of such possession and exercise. Among 
statesmen, the lovers of naked power are far less typical than those who aspire to clothe 
themselves in the mantle of legitimate authority; emperors may be nude, but they do not 
like to be so, to think themselves so, or to be so regarded” (Claude 1966: 368). 
It is almost fifty years ago, since Inis L. Claude shared the observations he made within 
the context of the UN system: apparently, rulers want to be legitimate and therefore 
engage in justifications. Surprisingly, research on legitimacy in general and the legiti-
macy of international institutions in particular has hardly drawn attention to the question 
of how, and by which means, political elites and institutions attempt to shape legitimacy 
actively, and whether such self-legitimation efforts are an effective means of stabilizing 
the legitimacy basis of political institutions. Although quite a few authors have pointed 
to such an elite-centered perspective (e.g. Barker 2001; Clark 2005; Reus-Smit 2007), 
corresponding empirical analyses are still missing. Following Max Weber, who has 
drawn attention to practices of self-legitimation and self-justification at various instanc-
es in his work (e.g. Weber 1978: 213), we argue that the self-legitimation of interna-
tional institutions is a highly relevant topic for a systematic empirical inquiry. Self-
legitimation efforts of international institutions are not only considered to be a relevant 
aspect of research on the legitimacy of international institutions they also provide im-
portant insights into their inner workings.  
Having identified this gap in legitimacy research, the present paper introduces and 
applies a top-down perspective to legitimation processes and suggests a conceptualiza-
tion of self-legitimation that is applicable to empirical inquiry. Since rulers’ self-
legitimizing efforts may assume a variety of different shapes, we provide a two-
dimensional typology that helps to structure diverse activities ranging from the distribu-
                                                 
1  The text stems from an ongoing research project at the University of Bremen funded by the German Research 
Foundation (DFG). We would like to thank the project director Frank Nullmeier as well as our research team col-
leagues Martin Nonhoff, Tanja Pritzlaff and Steffen Schneider for many fruitful discussions and their support in 
terms of data analysis and coding. For recent publications and a broader overview of our project work see Null-
meier et al. (2010) and Schneider et al. (2010). 
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tion of presents by the rotating presidency of the G8-summits to national delegations to 
the taking of the so called EU summit family photos over to public statements in which 
representatives of international institutions explicitly attribute legitimacy to their respec-
tive institution. Our typology differentiates on the one hand between internal and exter-
nal and on the other hand between explicit and implicit self-legitimation strategies. It 
provides a research agenda for the systematic analysis of this major aspect of empirical 
processes of legitimation.  
The paper proceeds as follows: The theoretical section introduces our basic under-
standing of the concept of legitimacy and summarizes the respective debates on the em-
pirical legitimacy of international institutions (2). As the main conclusion of this discus-
sion, we note that most empirical research neglects the question of how political elites 
and their self-legitimation strategies influence legitimation processes. To address this 
research gap we provide a conceptualization of legitimizing efforts of political elites and 
introduce our typology (3). The final section demonstrates how an empirical analysis of 
self-legitimations of representatives of the European Union (EU), the Group of Eight 
(G8) and the United Nations (UN) may be conducted (4). Our results indicate that self-
legitimations are indeed a relevant aspect of legitimation processes.  
2.  LEGITIMACY RESEARCH: CONCEPTS AND PERSPECTIVES  
Research on the legitimacy of political orders has become increasingly nuanced in the 
past decades. We witness a differentiation of conceptual presumptions as well as the 
expansion of the concept’s field of application. While the term legitimacy has been lim-
ited for a long time to the evaluation of the nation state, more recent research is increas-
ingly interested in legitimacy issues of international institutions and non-state actors 
such as NGOs or private companies. To situate the present paper in this field, the fol-
lowing section provides a short conceptual clarification and summarizes the recent re-
search on the legitimacy of international institutions.  
The research field of political legitimacy is often divided into an empirical and a 
normative strand. In normative variants of legitimacy research the term refers to the 
rightfulness or acceptability of political authority (Bernstein 2005; Buchanan/Keohane 
2006; Hurrelmann et al. 2007: 3). Here political theorists engage in an evaluation of the 
rightfulness of a political order according to the proximity or distance from normative 
standards which they promote (Barker 2007: 20). 
The second – empirical – strand of legitimacy research which draws on Max Weber’s 
work on legitimacy and legitimate domination, defines the term from the perspective of 
those affected by domination. Here, an authority is considered to be legitimate “if its 
subjects believe it to be so” – as Ian Clark (2005: 79) has succinctly put it. In this per-
spective researchers assume an observer’s perspective and gauge the legitimacy assess-
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ments of others – citizens, publics, and as advocated in this paper by the rulers themsel-
ves – and their normative benchmarks as social facts (Barker 2001; Gilley 2009; Reus-
Smit 2007). With the focus on legitimation efforts of political elites, our paper is clearly 
situated within the empirical strand of legitimacy research. 
The existing literature on the empirical legitimacy of international institutions 
(Ecker-Ehrhardt/Zürn 2007; Gronau et al. 2009; Nonhoff et al. 2009; Nullmeier et al. 
2010; Quack 2010; Zürn et al. 2007) already encompasses detailed studies dealing with 
the quality of political support enjoyed by specific international institutions such as the 
G8 (Gronau 2010a), the UN (Cronin/Hurd 2008; Morris/Wheeler 2007; Schmidtke 
2010) and the EU (Biegoń 2010; Hix 2008; Thomassen 2009). The general conclusion 
that can be drawn from these empirical studies is threefold: First, Michael Zürn and his 
colleagues (2004; 2006; 2007) contend that more and more international institutions are 
faced with serious societal acceptance problems (see also Nanz/Steffek 2004). While 
questions of the legitimacy of international institutions have long been an issue solely of 
interest for small academic circles, an awareness of the shortcomings of global gover-
nance arrangements seems to have reached the broader public (Schmidtke 2011). Inter-
national institutions increasingly run the risk of being seriously questioned both by nati-
onal governments as well as their citizens.  
Second, scholars observe that the normative criteria applied to evaluate the legitima-
cy of international institutions seem to become more demanding and are no longer re-
stricted to performance criteria (Dingwerth 2011; Buchanan/Keohane 2006; Christiano 
2011) – a benchmark which has long dominated the evaluation of international institu-
tions (Beetham/Lord 1998: 12). Democratic normative standards hitherto applied for the 
evaluations of the nation state’s legitimacy, e.g. input criteria, such as representative-
ness and participation, and throughput criteria, such as transparency and accountability, 
are transferred to the international context (Seabrocke 2007). The plausibility of both 
assumptions – recently discussed under the heading of the “politicization” of interna-
tional institutions (cf. Ecker-Ehrhardt/Zürn 2007; Zürn et al. 2007; from a critical point 
of view Brock 2007; Nölke 2007; Wiener 2009; Nonhoff 2009) – are illustrated by the 
rise of transnational mass protests against e.g. the WTO, the IMF and the EU.2 
                                                 
2  The recently proposed theory of the politicization of international institutions assumes that civil society actors 
increasingly make use of democratic benchmarks to evaluate international institutions. In line with the theory of 
politicization of international institutions put forward by Zürn and his colleagues, especially those governance ar-
rangements equipped with the process of majority rule or quasi-judicial settlements are affected. Mass protests 
do, indeed, serve as an indicator for international institutions’ acceptance problems, but further investigations 
need to be done to qualify the argument of a shift of norms from performance to democratically more substantial 
ones. 
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Finally, most empirical studies dealing with the empirical legitimacy of international 
institutions have a common point of departure - which at the same time constitutes the 
research gap to be addressed in this contribution: They favor a bottom-up approach in-
vestigating the attitudes, behavior and evaluations of citizens and nation states towards 
international institutions and are, thus, solely concerned with the question of how sub-
jects of international institutions’ authority contribute to the legitimation process. What 
is still largely missing is an elite-centered perspective, which pays attention to the legi-
timation efforts employed by international institutions and its representatives. In other 
words, what has hitherto been neglected is the “impulse of the powerful to try to legiti-
mate their power” (Hurd 1999: 388). Although such an elite-centered perspective on 
legitimation has been hinted at by various authors (Barker 2001; Clark 2005, 2007; 
Reus-Smit 2007) it has rarely been applied to empirical research dealing with the legi-
timacy of international institutions (for an exception see Halliday et al. 2010). Given 
that in the post-national constellation, global governance arrangements are faced with 
growing acceptance problems and resistance, it is particularly insightful to adopt an 
elite-centered focus and study in greater detail how exactly international institutions are 
reacting to rising demands and potentially decreasing levels of political support. More 
generally speaking, the study of self-legitimations does not only enhance our under-
standing of legitimation processes. Furthermore, it also sheds light on the inner work-
ings of international institutions and their efforts to maintain authority.  
3.  SELF-LEGITIMATIONS – A TOP-DOWN PERSPECTIVE ON 
LEGITIMATION  
The previous remarks have demonstrated that self-legitimations constitute an indeed 
auspicious but under-researched object. A more thorough conceptualization of self-
legitimations is necessary to make it amenable to empirical research. The concept has its 
theoretical roots in Max Weber’s sociology, where he coined the terms legitimacy claim 
or self-justification respectively (1978: 213, 954). There are various instances in We-
ber’s work in which he points out that the claiming of legitimacy is a ubiquitous activity 
in which political leaders constantly engage:  
“Experience shows that in no instance does domination voluntarily limit itself to the 
appeal to material or affectual or ideal motives as a basis for its continuance. In addi-
tion every such system attempts to cultivate the belief in its legitimacy. But according to 
the kind of legitimacy which is claimed, the type of obedience, the kind of administrative 
staff, and the mode of exercising authority will differ fundamentally. Equally fundamen-
tal is variation in effect. Hence, it is useful to classify the types of domination according 
to the claim to legitimacy typically made by each” (Weber 1978: 213). 
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The concept of self-legitimation denotes a top-down process in which political elites 
take center stage as “producers of legitimacy“. In contrast to the prevailing use of the 
term legitimation, which conceives of government as the recipient or beneficiary of le-
gitimacy beliefs of subjects (Barker 2001: 43), Weber’s legitimacy theory includes a 
notion of government as an active and initiating actor (ibid.), which goes to great 
lengths in establishing or maintaining its legitimacy. From this perspective it is the 
“rulers (…), not the citizens, who are the active players“ (ibid.: 108) in legitimation 
processes.  
There are a number of authors who have explicitly taken up this “ruler-centric” 
(Merquior 1980: 306) perspective on legitimation and developed this approach further. 
For instance, David Easton (1975; 1979: 247-342) and Renate Mayntz (1975) have sug-
gested different conceptualizations and classifications of self-legitimations of political 
elites. The work by Michael Saward (2006; 2010) and his reconceptualization of a theo-
ry of representation likewise emphasizes top-down processes of legitimation.3 Above 
all, Rodney Barker (2001; 2003) has made one of the most comprehensive attempts to 
put political elites and not citizens at the center of the conceptualization of legitimation. 
Yet, with the exception of Saward, the above mentioned studies have, to a large extent, 
mainly dealt with top-down legitimation processes in a national context with only minor 
references to how international institutions’ self-legitimations might look like (Barker 
2003; see also Halliday et al. 2010). While adopting this top-down perspective on legit-
imation processes and by drawing on the insights explicated by the above mentioned 
authors we propose to apply this research perspective on legitimation to the study of 
international institutions.  
3.1 Varieties of Self-Legitimations 
On a most general level self-legitimations can be understood as practices employed by 
political elites to positively influence the legitimation process. This rather broad defini-
tion covers a whole range of different types of self-legitimations. For analytical purpos-
es it is helpful to distinguish two dimensions along which self-legitimations vary: inter-
nal-external, implicit-explicit. In this section we discuss these key lines of variation of 
self-legitimations as a way of mapping some of its main features.  
                                                 
3  Saward advances the idea of a representative claim and sketches a revised theory of representation. In contrast to 
traditional accounts of representation, he takes non-electoral forms of representation seriously and emphasizes the 
importance of performance to representation. He suggests that “representation in politics is at least a two way 
street: the represented play a role in choosing representatives, and representatives ‘chose’ their constituencies in 
the sense of portraying them or framing them in particular contestable ways” (Saward 2006: 302). 
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Internal or external self-legitimations are the first two central variants that can be 
distinguished analytically. At the core of this distinction is the audience of self-
legitimations. The audience is the group of persons who are addressed and receive, i.e. 
hear, read, watch etc., the self-legitimations of political elites. Attempts to legitimize 
themselves as political rulers may occur within an international institution or in the wid-
er public. Self-legitimations that take place among a small circle of political elites with-
in the international institutions – e.g. within the bureaucracy – are understood to be in-
ternal. External self-legitimations, by contrast, are usually voiced publicly and are per-
ceived by a significantly wider circle of people. It goes without saying, that a clear-cut 
differentiation of external and internal self-legitimations can only be drawn analytically. 
Of course, those legitimizing themselves will never have complete control over how 
their claims are communicated and who receives them. Documents addressing interna-
tional institutions’ officials, constituting examples of internal self-legitimation may, for 
instance, be taken up by the media and might then have an impact on the wider public. 
Nevertheless, differentiating practices of self-legitimation with respect to the primary 
audience can help to get to grips with different, indeed very heterogeneous, forms of 
cultivating legitimacy. 
Rodney Barker has attributed particular importance to internal forms of self-
legitimations. He asserts “that rulers are not in the first instance concerned about what 
those whom they rule think, nor whether their own cultivated image of themselves is 
recognized and approved by ordinary people” (Barker 2001: 106). Instead, he claims, it 
is the relationship between the administrative staff and the rulers that is of vital im-
portance for the stability of a political system. By underlining the relevance of internal 
self-legitimations, Barker draws on Weber who has likewise emphasized that the recog-
nition of authority by the administrative staff plays a pivotal role (Weber 1978: 122).4  
In the international context, internal forms of self-legitimations take place between 
member states and their officials, between member states and the secretariat of interna-
tional institutions or between different bureaucratic departments of an international in-
stitution (Buchanan 2011). In fact, research dealing with the legitimacy of international 
politics has long focused exclusively on internal forms of legitimation, since legitimacy 
has long been considered to be an issue among states (Steffek 2007: 175, see also Null-
meier et al. 2010). In the early research on international legitimacy it was the acceptance 
of international institutions by states that dominated the academic debate (e.g. Hurd 
                                                 
4  Many scholars dealing with the fall of the Soviet regime have followed this perspective underlining that it were 
processes of internal legitimation that were deficient and that finally led to the downfall of the Soviet empire 
(Rigby/Fehér 1982). 
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1999: 401). Beetham and Lord sum up this traditional model of international legitimacy 
as follows:  
“Like any other political body exercising jurisdiction, international institutions require 
justification in terms of the purposes or ends they serve, which cannot be met by other 
means, in this case the nation states themselves, or at the individual state level. (…) Yet, 
such justifications rarely percolate out beyond a narrow elite group; nor do they need 
to, it could be argued, since these institutions are not dependent on the cooperation of a 
wider public to effect their purposes. It is not the direct cooperation of ordinary citizens 
that is required to maintain the authority of the UN, the Gatt, of Nato, etc. but that of 
the member states and their officials; and it is the behavior of these alone, therefore 
that considerations of legitimacy are important” (Betham/Lord 1998: 12). 
In contrast to this traditional conception of international legitimacy, which Beetham and 
Lord themselves consider to be “overdrawn” (ibid.) more recent IR legitimacy literature 
– in particular its normative variant – has started to shift attention and embraced more 
thoroughly the relationship between the citizens and international institutions (Steffek 
2007: 175; see also Zürn et al. 2007).  
This widening of the audience of legitimacy relationships of international institutions 
does not only take place in normative debates, it can also be observed empirically in 
international institutions’ efforts to gain legitimacy. Representatives of the G8, the EU 
and the UN constantly present or justify themselves to the wider public. Being aware 
that an elite consensus is no longer sufficient for the stability of international institutions 
(for the context of the EU see in particular Hooghe and Marks [2008]) their representa-
tives increasingly engage in external self-legitimation practices. In press conferences, 
speeches and other public performances they offer arguments and justifications for the 
political authority of international institutions and thereby actively participate in the 
construction of legitimacy.  
Implicitness and explicitness is the second central dimension along which self-
legitimations vary. At the core of this dimension is the question of whether the aim of 
generating legitimacy is stated openly and outright or not. Self-legitimations may be 
very explicit, e.g. strategy papers dealing openly with the question of how legitimacy 
can be generated. These self-legitimations often have a verbal nature and are thus ame-
nable to text-analytical research. At other times self-legitimations can be so implicit that 
they are barely recognizable as a means to influence the legitimation process. In particu-
lar, non-verbal efforts by political elites fostering the identification with international 
institutions and forging certain identity constructions fall into the second category. Here 
self-legitimations are closely linked to self-representations or self-identifications.  
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The conceptualization and analysis of very subtle, implicit forms of self-
legitimations has been undertaken by Rodney Barker (2001). He basically conceives of 
self-legitimations as an identity building activity: 
“The principal way in which people issuing commands are legitimated is by their being 
identified as special, marked by particular qualities, set apart from other people. When 
rulers legitimate themselves, they give an account of who they are, in writing, in imag-
es, in more or less ceremonial actions and practices. The action both creates and ex-
presses the identity” (Barker 2001: 35). 
Following Barker, implicit self-legitimations have a constitutive function. These prac-
tices basically constitute the identity of the legitimator, making authority possible in the 
first place (ibid.: 112). In his conceptualization of self-legitimations, the analysis of rou-
tinized behavior such as private or public rites, rituals and ceremonies take center stage 
(see also Hurd 2008: 48-60) – all of which fulfill the function of confirming the identity 
of authority. 
Explicit self-legitimations – i.e. the verbal often strategic activities of gaining legiti-
macy – have already been dealt with by a number of authors. Marc C. Suchman (1995) 
has, for instance, scrutinized self-legitimations of private companies and proposes a 
typology of legitimation strategies, private organizations employ to gain, maintain, or 
repair legitimacy. He suggests paying attention to organizations’ “legitimacy manage-
ment”, i.e. the active, purposeful and success-oriented engagement in the cultivation of 
legitimacy as a viable field of study. In a similar vein, political scientists such as David 
Easton have also extensively dealt with means and measures political institutions might 
employ to deal with stress in terms of erosion of political support (Easton 1979: 247-
341, see also Mayntz 1975), and suggest to study the “deliberate and calculated actions 
on the part of political leadership or some segment of the authorities to meet the condi-
tions conducing to stress” (Easton 1979: 247). For the international sphere this field of 
study has still to be disclosed. There are only few authors, who engage in an analysis of 
explicit self-legitimations of international institutions (e.g. Black 2008). Only the Euro-
pean Union’s practices of legitimacy generation have already attracted the attention of 
some influential scholars (see, for instance, Featherstone 1994; Shore 2000; Wal-
lace/Smith 1995). In sum, the analytical differentiations made above can be summarized 
in the typology shown in table 1. 
Self-legitimations may be internal and implicit. These types of self-legitimations are 
particularly difficult to study. First, because they are so discreet that they might not im-
mediately be recognizable as instances to influence the legitimation process and second 
because they take place in a small circle of political elites within international instituti-
ons. Prime examples for these subtle practices of self-legitimations are the presents dis-
tributed by the rotating presidency of the G8/G20-summits to national delegations. The-
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se presents vary annually and include rather common artifacts such as ball-point pens, 
bags, maps and rain jackets and more extraordinary ones such as  ashtrays and pencil 
holders given to the heads of state and government in 1981 in Ottawa – all of which are 
decorated with special engravings showing a G8/G20 logo (Gronau 2010b). This habit 
of distributing presents can be conceived of as an identity-confirming measure, making 
the heads of government and state aware of belonging to the exclusive club of the 
G8/G20.  
Table 1: Typology of Self-Legitimations 
 Implicit Explicit 
Internal 
Self-identifications 
Internal routines, ceremonies and rituals 
Examples: G8/G20 presents distributed 
to national and media delegations 
Legitimation strategies/policies 
communication policy, public relations 
strategy paper, institutional reform plans 
Examples: EU Plan D for Democracy, 
Dialogue and Debate 
External 
Self-representations 
Public routines, ceremonies and rituals, 
Examples: G8, EU, UN summit family 
photos  
Self-justifications 
press conferences and other public 
statements in which political elites offer 
justifications of their institutions  
Examples: G8 Accountability Report 
 
Implicit self-legitimation can be displayed publicly and might therefore also be external. 
Here self-legitimations often take the form of self-representations; most obviously the 
authorized “family photos” taken during the G8 and EU summits, which are afterwards 
reproduced extensively in the media, where they reach a larger audience. These “family 
photos rituals” are examples of implicit and external self-legitimations which facilitate 
certain identity constructions of the respective institution and their representatives and 
offer instances of identification both for the heads of state and government themselves 
as well as for the wider public. 
Furthermore, self-legitimations may take the form of explicit considerations of how 
legitimacy can be gained and may materialize in communication policy and public rela-
tions strategy papers, institutional reform plans or any other document produced by in-
ternational institutions addressed to the closer circle of officials, dealing explicitly with 
the question of how legitimacy can be generated. These documents constitute examples 
of internal forms of self-legitimations when they are pieces of intra-organizational 
communication, i.e. when officials from national governments or the secretariat of the 
international institution are the primary addressees.  
Our own research on the legitimation strategies of the EU has revealed that there are 
indeed an abundance of internal documents in which the EU institutions explicitly deal 
with the question of how legitimacy can be gained (Biegoń 2011). This is not only true 
for the EU but also for other international institutions. A significant example is constitu-
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ted by the reform plans different international institutions implemented in the last de-
cades in order to improve civil society participation (Liese 2009) and accountability as 
well as transparency regimes (Barnett 1997) – most of which are direct reactions to 
falling levels of political support. 
Finally, self-legitimations may be explicit and external. Here, self-legitimations take 
the form of public statements in which representatives of international institutions offer 
justifications for their institutions. Public justifications for international institutions can 
be voiced in press conferences, speeches, interviews etc. and they reach a particularly 
wide audience if they are taken up by the media. Focusing on these self-legitimations 
pays tribute to the communicative dimension of legitimation processes. In various pre-
vious publications we have outlined the pivotal role that language and communication 
play in the (re-)production and transformation of legitimacy (Schneider et al. 2010; 
Nullmeier et al. 2010, see also Steffek 2003 and Reus-Smit 2007: 163). According to 
this research perspective, the successful reproduction of legitimacy is dependent on pro-
cesses of political communication in which political elites need to “justify their own 
authority – as well as the basic principles of the regimes and institutions they represent 
– and in doing so they have to provide citizens with normatively acceptable reasons for 
the compliance that is expected of them” (Schneider et al. 2010: 33).  
4.  EXPLICIT EXTERNAL SELF-LEGITIMATION OF THREE 
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 
The empirical section of the paper exemplifies the applicability of our conceptual 
framework by an analysis of explicit external communicative acts of self-legitimation 
uttered by representatives of three major international institutions: the European Union 
(EU), the Group of Eight (G8) and the United Nations (UN). Hence, it is no attempt to 
provide an empirical analysis of the entire field of self-legitimation strategies presented 
in the previous section but limited to one possible way of exploring self-legitimation 
strategies situated in the lower-right box of our two by two matrix.  
4.1.  Methods and Data 
The inquiry draws on a large corpus of newspaper articles each of which contains at 
least one statement dealing with the legitimacy of the selected international institutions. 
The choice of international institutions is based on the hypothesis that organizations 
with varying opportunity structures in terms of staff and budget can be expected to 
apply different self-legitimation strategies because the chances of actors to become vi-
sible in the public and especially in the media depend on their capacities and their actual 
influence (Koopmans et al. 2010). Hence, we picked empirically relevant international 
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governance arrangements with a high budget, large staff, and strong political influence 
(the EU) (Robinson 2009; Trondal 2010) and international institutions that have basical-
ly no money at their disposal and operate on the basis of very few employees or depend 
like the G8 on a workforce provided by national bureaucracies (Hajnal 2007). The UN 
was chosen to represent a middle ground in this respect (Weiss/Daws 2007).  
The rational for choosing articles from quality newspapers instead of, for instance, 
television news coverage, tabloid papers, or documents published by the selected insti-
tutions themselves is twofold: First, we argue that – by definition – external (self-
)legitimation statements can only be assumed to be influential if they are highly visible  
in the public (Koopmans 2007: 183). Media discourses satisfy this criterion and are, 
thus, a crucial element of processes of (self-)legitimation. These discourses contribute to 
shaping the legitimacy beliefs and behavioral dispositions of citizens. Hence, the media 
constitutes the discursive forum which displays our object of study in a most intense 
form. Secondly, we recognize the prominent role of the quality press in Western democ-
racies. While other news outlets such as television or tabloid papers are, of course, im-
portant media outlets, we argue that the quality press functions as the strongest trans-
mission belt and gatekeeper between the political system and its citizens. As this trans-
mission function lies at the core of the interactive understanding of legitimation pre-
sented in this paper, we consider our focus on quality newspapers warranted. The sam-
ple is furthermore narrowed down to two opinion leading quality newspapers – repre-
senting the (center-)right and (center-)left,5 from Switzerland, Germany, Great Britain 
and the United States over a time span of ten years (1998-2007). Our sample of four 
Western democracies was chosen to provide for some representativeness in terms of 
political- and media cultures and institutional arrangements.  
We coded individual statements that evaluate the legitimacy of the selected interna-
tional institutions. These evaluations were operationalized as quasi-sentences (Klinge-
mann et al. 2006; Koopmans/Statham 1999) that can be identified and described with 
the help of a stylized legitimation “grammar” (Table 2). This grammar is constituted by 
three key variables: the assessed legitimation object, the positive (legitimizing) or nega-
tive (delegitimizing) evaluative character of the statement, and the normative criterion 
(pattern of legitimation) on which it is based. 
This methodology of political valuation analysis (Schmidtke/Nullmeier 2011) can al-
so be applied to other text corpora, such as manifestos, strategy papers, debates, and 
other strategic communicative acts, produced by international institutions and their rep-
                                                 
5  Times and Guardian for Britain, Washington Post and New York Times for the United States, Frankfurter Allge-
meine Zeitung and Süddeutsche Zeitung for Germany, and Neue Zürcher Zeitung and Tagesanzeiger for Switzer-
land.  
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resentatives and therefore provides a toolkit that is particularly suitable for further em-
pirical analyses of external communicative acts of self-legitimation. 
As a census analysis for two newspapers in four countries over a time span of ten 
years implies massive workload a sampling strategy reducing this effort was applied. 
Following the notion of intensity sampling6 data analysis was limited to time periods of 
high public attention. Regarding international institutions this condition is best fulfilled 
by the annual summits of the selected organization (Couldry et al. 2010). One summit 
per organization and year was selected. Articles containing relevant statements were 
retrieved for a time frame of ten days around the summits.  
Table 2: Legitimation Grammar and Examples 
Example 1: “The European democratic deficit is not only a matter of secretive or unresponsive leaders 
but of muddled and unrealistic citizens, and both must change their ways if Europe is to find a way out 
of its troubles.” (Guardian, 20/06/2005) 
The EU … is illegitimate … because it is … 1. undemocratic 
2. intransparent. 
3. unaccountable 
Example 2: “Tony Blair, who is to host the G8 in 2005, also defended what he said was the value of 
summits in focusing minds and setting the lead for the world economy.” (Times, 04/06/2003) 
The G8 … is legitimate … because of its… charismatic leadership. 
Example 3: “Mr. Annan's office took the unusual step of releasing his remarks last night to underscore 
his caution that there is ''no substitute for the unique legitimacy provided by the United Nations.” (New 
York Times, 12/09/2002) 
The UN … is legitimate …   
 
4.2.  Empirical Findings – Your Majesty, famed is thy legitimacy! 7  
Based on our dataset of 5456 legitimation propositions we explore public self-
legitimation statements of genuine representatives of the EU, G8, and UN, such as the 
head of the European Commission, the UN secretary general or the head of a G8 sum-
mit, and national representatives of respective member states, such as the British Prime 
Minister or the German Chancellor, which we assume to be the central self-legitimizers 
of international institutions. In the case of the G8 and the EU these two groups are not 
                                                 
6  Patton (2002) defines this method as the selection of information-rich cases that manifest the phenomena of 
interest intensely. 
7  As the title of the paper this phrase refers to the famous fairy tale by the Brothers Grimm. In the story of “Snow 
White and the seven Dwarfs” each day the Queen and stepmother of Snow White consults her Magic Mirror. 
“What wouldst thou know, my Queen?” The Queen asks her Magic Mirror the famous question: Magic Mirror on 
the wall, Who is the fairest one of all? The Magic Mirror cannot lie, and must admit that there is someone else 
other than the Queen who is the fairest in the land. 
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perfectly distinct. Hence, we double attribute representatives of national governments if 
they hold the rotating position as chair of a G8 summit or as the presidency of the 
Council of the European Union as both representative of the G8/EU and a national poli-
tician8. Furthermore we controlled for the origin of speakers and coded only those as 
national politicians that originate from member states of the selected organizations9. The 
corpus is, however, not limited to these speakers so that we are able to compare com-
municative legitimation strategies of representatives of international institutions to the 
entire legitimation discourse shaped by additional groups of speakers, such as journa-
lists, civil society representatives, and economic actors.  
In the following, we focus on a comparative analysis of self-legitimation strategies 
and exclude possible developments over time. Although variance over time is a relevant 
issue as well, the main focus here is on variation across organizations and groups of 
speakers. Subsequent to an overview of our data, it is shown that compared to other 
speaker groups, both groups of potential self-legitimizers have indeed a clear tendency 
to legitimize their respective international institutions. A more detailed inquiry of par-
ticular arguments used for public external self-legitimation statements presented in the 
remainder of the sections seems to suggest that although our selected organizations do 
not only vary in terms of staff and budget but are also different with respect to policy 
areas and political authority, their representatives use similar arguments in their legiti-
macy claims.  
Legitimacy Discourses 
As our theoretical framework suggests, public legitimacy discourses on international 
institutions are not solely populated by civil society speakers, ordinary persons and 
other non-state actors (here subsumed under the category of other speakers) but re-
presentatives of international institutions themselves and speakers of member states 
play a role as well. In all three debates on the selected institutions representatives make 
use of mass media communication and evaluate the legitimacy of their respective orga-
nizations to a considerable extent. As we assume that these statements are influential in 
shaping general understandings of legitimacy it can be noted that – in line with our 
propositions – processes of legitimation can by no means be considered to be purely 
bottom-up. The discursive legitimation of international governance arrangements and 
other political regimes is rather an alternating process of de- and re-legitimation borne 
by both rulers and subjects. 
                                                 
8  Hence the number of statements considered changes to 5558. 
9  Although Switzerland became only a full member of the UN in 2002, we decided to include its national politi-
cians because Switzerland is affiliated to the UN in various ways since the formation of the organization. 
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Figure 1: Legitimacy Statements per Speaker Group and Organization 
 
Note: The width of the column shows the relative distribution of statements across international institutions. The 
white and grayish parts indicate the distribution of statements across speakers in the respective institution. 
While this observation holds in general for all three governance arrangements, Figure 1 
points also to considerable variance across speaker groups and organizations. Regarding 
the latter, the figure displays that contributions of G8 representatives are less frequent 
(12.5 percent of all statements on the G8) than for the EU (27.9 percent of all statements 
on the EU) and the UN (48.4 percent of all statements on the UN). The modest impact 
of G8-representatives seems to be in line with our hypothesis on the positive relation-
ship between international institutions’ capacities and the amount of self-legitimation 
statements. However, this picture is distorted by the strong presence of UN-speakers 
that outnumber the utterances of EU-spokespersons by more than twenty percent alt-
hough the latter disposes by far of the most resources. With almost half of all UN-
related propositions, speakers representing the UN dominate the entire debate and play a 
significantly more important role than, for instance, civil society speakers, whose state-
ments amount only to 16.3 percent of all legitimacy propositions referring to the UN.  
In terms of variance across speaker groups we observe a similar pattern for all three 
organizations. National politicians seem to be more active or better equipped to become 
more active in the field of self-legitimation than the organization’s genuine spokesper-
sons. This effect is most pronounced in the case of the G8 and the UN where the ratio of 
representatives of international institutions to national politicians is almost one to three 
or one to two respectively. Activities of EU-representatives, on the other hand, are more 
balanced as the difference amounts only to five percent between both groups. 
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In sum, this overview helps to demonstrate that representatives of international  insti-
tutions do, indeed, actively participate in legitimation discourses and are, thus, strongly 
involved in shaping the verdict of the ‘mirror of legitimacy’. Furthermore, our compari-
son across speaker groups and organizations seems to imply that not all organizations 
are equally well equipped to pursue this activity. While the UN seems to be very effec-
tive in influencing public legitimacy debates, we observe a less strong impact of the EU 
and especially the G8. As political and financial capacity cannot account fully for this 
result further research on the question of why some organizations are more influential 
than others is needed.  
Level of Self-Legitimation  
So far our analysis included both negative and positive legitimation propositions. As the 
focus of the present paper is, however, on self-legitimation, we now turn attention to 
statements with a positive evaluative thrust. In this respect, we expect that both spokes-
persons of international institutions and member state governments argue predominantly 
in favor of the legitimacy of their respective organizations, i.e. engage in self-
legitimation. Figure 2, however, displays a more nuanced pattern. The share of positive 
statements varies across organizations and – to a lesser extent though – across speaker 
groups. While G8 spokespersons (92.9 percent) and member state representatives (73.2 
percent) fulfill our basic expectation of utterly positive evaluations of their organization, 
this is barely the case for the EU discourse and can only be confirmed to some extent 
for the UN debate. Most surprising are the results for the representatives of the EU and 
its member state governments. Neither of the two groups achieves a minimum of fifty 
percent of positive evaluations, which implies that in more than half of all cases re-
presentatives of the European Union and its member states question the legitimacy of 
this organization or one of its major components. 
Although the results for the UN are not so much different, it can be noted that, after all, 
national politicians (55.4 percent) utter self-legitimizing evaluations more often than 
not. Its genuine representatives such as the Secretary General, on the other hand, seem 
to be rather less convinced (47.8 percent).  
Although, the results for the EU and the UN are not fully in line with our expecta-
tions, it can still be noted that representatives of all three organizations evaluate the le-
gitimacy of their respective organizations much more favorably than other speakers. In 
none of our cases does this group exceed the level of twenty percent positive statements 
and is, thus, less than half as positive as the political representatives of the selected or-
ganizations.  
This brings us to variance across speaker groups. This aspect assumes only marginal 
proportions in the case of the EU and the UN. In both legitimacy debates the share of 
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self-legitimations is almost equal for spokespersons of international institutions and 
national politicians and only slightly dominated by holders of national political offic-
es.10 A strong difference is, however, observable in the case of the G8. Not only is the 
gap between the relevant speaker groups larger than for the other two international insti-
tutions (19.6 percent) but the pattern is also reversed implying a stronger self-
legitimation role for the heads of G8 summits than for national governments’ represent-
atives. 
Figure 2:  Share of Positive Legitimation Statements across Organizations and  
Speakers Groups 
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We note that although the share of self-legitimizing statements appears to be lower than 
expected and both groups of representatives of international institutions can by no 
means be described as pure self-legitimizers our results can still be interpreted as an 
indicator for the application of self-legitimation strategies by these actors. While other 
speakers are even more critical and level around a share of twenty percent of positive 
statements, representatives of international institutions contribute substantially to the 
presentation of positive images of their respective institutions. Hence, representatives of 
international institutions can be considered to be able to influence the ‘mirror’s’ verdict 
in their favors.  
                                                 
10  For the EU the share of positive spokespersons of international institutions is 2.1 percent lower  than that of 
government representatives. For the UN this difference amount to 7.6 percent.  
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Legitimacy Patterns 
To delineate more precisely how these positive images are shaped and injected into the 
discourse on the legitimacy of the selected organization the remainder of the section is 
devoted to the normative foundations (patterns of legitimation) spokespersons of inter-
national institutions and representatives of member state governments evoke in their 
self-legitimations. (langer Satz!)Hence, this part of the analysis is limited to the share of 
positive legitimacy statements and excludes the negative ones.11  
We identified 29 criteria which we assume to constitute potential legitimation pat-
terns of political regimes. These patterns are partly drawn from democratic theory litera-
ture and partly inductively extracted from the textual material used for the inquiry at 
hand (for a complete list see appendix 1). With respect to our theoretical concerns we 
classify legitimation patterns with the help of a two dimensional typology. The first or-
ganizing distinction is provided by Scharpf’s (1999) widely accepted distinction be-
tween input and output legitimacy. Following this thought legitimacy propositions can 
either discuss the quality of a decision making process or its results. While statements of 
the first type are considered to fall into the input category, we classify the latter as out-
put-related.  
The second distinction builds on the idea that legitimacy claims may either refer to 
democracy-based criteria such as popular sovereignty or to non-democracy-related is-
sues such as the effectiveness of political regimes. The distinction between democracy-
based and non-democracy-based criteria builds on an undemanding definition of democ-
racy offered, for instance, by Schattschneider: “Democracy is a competitive political 
system in which competing leaders and organizations define the alternatives of public 
policy in such a way that the public can participate in the decision-making process.” 
(Schattschneider 1960: 138). This definition leaves enough room to include a variety of 
input and output aspects of an institution that can be relevant for the existence of such a 
system. Evaluation criteria pointing to these aspects are classified as democracy-based, 
whereas arguments referring to elements not essential – though not necessarily antithet-
ical – to a democratic system of governance are classified as non-democracy-based 
(Hurrelmann et al. 2005: 123). 
These distinctions result in four categories of legitimation patterns: democracy-based 
input (DI), democracy-based output (DO), non-democracy-based input (NDI), and non-
democracy-based output (NDO). In addition we introduce a fifth group of general val-
uations that do not make use of an explicit criterion or refer to other rather peculiar ar-
guments that do not fit the typology. In this category, we group statements like “there is 
                                                 
11  n=1444 
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no alternative to the United Nations” (Guardian, 24/09/2003), or “demonstrations 
against the illegitimate G8” (Times, 02/06/2003). 
Figure 3: Frequency Distribution of Positive Statements across Legitimation Patterns 
 
Note: The width of the column shows the relative distribution of statements across speaker groups. The white and 
grayish parts indicate the distribution of statements across speakers in the respective IO. 
Figure 3 displays the distribution of positive legitimation statements across speaker 
groups and legitimation patterns for the three selected governance arrangements. At first 
glance it can be observed that similar to the group of other speakers both spokespersons 
of international institutions and national government representatives of all three interna-
tional institutions make use – to a varying degree though – of all five groups of legiti-
mation patterns. It seems, therefore, that self-legitimizers try to cater their strategies to a 
broad variety of possible criticisms.  
On the other hand, it has to be taken into account that the distribution of legitimating 
propositions is in all three debates dominated by non-democracy-based criteria. In this 
vein, for instance José Manuel Barroso takes up the opportunity to legitimize the Euro-
pean Union by characterizing it as “[…] a uniquely effective instrument for helping the 
UK and other European countries to develop solutions to […] new, cross-border chal-
lenges.” For him “[…] this is the EU’s raison d’être for the 21st century: to help Europe-
ans prosper in a globalized world” (both Guardian, 18/10/2006). The same is true for 
the G8 and the UN where we also discover a variety of similar statements, for in-
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stance,hailing the “substantial progress” the G8’s 2005 Africa package implied (Blair in 
Guardian, 09/072005) or former US president Bush praising the effectiveness of the 
UN by pointing out that “[…] the world works better when we act together” (Washing-
ton Post, 24/09/2005). As all three organizations can be assumed to have a rather weak 
democratic flank, this special attention to non-democracy-based criteria is striking. Self-
legitimizers of all three organizations seem to focus especially on propositions high-
lighting the particular strength of their organizations rather than tackling the more prob-
lematic aspects of their legitimacy. This issue becomes even more apparent regarding 
the category of general legitimacy propositions. For both organizations; the UN and the 
G8, these particular legitimation patterns, by which legitimacy is claimed without any 
reference to a normative foundation, make up more than one third of the entire set of 
self-legitimating statements. An example of these contributions is provided by former 
UN Secretary General Kofi Annan who repeatedly evokes “[…] the unique legitimacy 
provided by the United Nations” (New York Times, 24/09/2003). While EU-
representatives seem to have realized that the legitimacy of their organization is truly 
precarious and that general assurances of the EU’s invulnerable legitimacy are no longer 
enough in times of the ‘constraining dissensus’ (Hooghe/Marks 2008), representatives 
of both the UN and the G8 still stick to this idea. They do not support their positive 
evaluations argumentatively in more than one third of the cases. This result seems to 
imply that the rising societal politicization did so far not sink into their minds. Although 
societal demands and public criticisms are concerned with particular aspects of both 
organizations, their representatives quite often do not feel compelled to seriously take 
up these concerns in their public external legitimation strategies.  
In sum, the inquiry of legitimation patterns reveals, on the one hand, a profound di-
versity of self-legitimation strategies applied by representatives of all three selected 
international institutions. On the other hand, we also discover the dominance of patterns 
that aim to highlight the perceived strength of international institutions namely their 
pareto-optimizing functions, which we often find in IR textbooks (Beetham/Lord 1998: 
12). Furthermore, the large share of general and unsupported positive evaluations in the 
context of the EU and the G8 is striking because it seems to indicate some missing sen-
sitivity for the precarious legitimacy of these two organizations.  
5.  CONCLUSION 
Our empirical findings demonstrate that international institutions’ formal representati-
ves and member states actively take part in the process of legitimation. Hence, interna-
tional governance arrangements are not only objects of legitimacy demands, but at the 
same time cultivators of their own legitimacy. By answering the questions of whether 
and how international institutions and its representatives actively claim legitimacy, this 
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paper addressed two issues: First, we introduced a top-down perspective on the empiri-
cal legitimation of international institutions by presenting our concept of self-
legitimation of political institutions and its representatives. At the core of the concept is 
the idea that self-legitimations are not only cheap talk or simple rhetorical means, but 
rather influence the modes of obedience and the authority of international institutions. 
We proposed that the field of possible self-legitimations can be divided into at least two 
dimensions, external vs. internal and explicit vs. implicit self-legitimation.  
Second, we exemplified this top-down perspective on legitimation – which stands in 
sharp contrast to traditional research focusing on the “demos” (national level) or the 
nation state (international level) – by an analysis of media debates on the perceived le-
gitimacy of the G8, the EU, and the UN. This allowed us to examine one of the four 
introduced varieties, the explicit external self-legitimation of representatives of interna-
tional institutions and member states. 
In particular, our empirical findings indicate that UN-legitimators were the most vi-
sible speakers in the analyzed quality press, followed by those of the EU and the less 
active G8. Most of the representatives of all three international institutions tend to 
present themselves in a more favorable light if compared to the evaluations of other 
actors presented in the media. It seems that different from the Magic Mirror in the fairy 
tale of Snow White the mirror of international institutions are able to lie when they are 
consulted by representatives of international institutions. Concerning the criteria used to 
evaluate the analyzed institutions, representatives of international institutions and mem-
ber states more often rely on traditional benchmarks which have for a long time domina-
ted IR literature, such as performance and efficiency criteria. While those output-related 
criteria dominate the field of external explicit self-legitimations, especially representati-
ves of the UN and the G8 complement their set of criteria by simply claiming legi-
timacy without reference to any normative benchmark. In contrast to the general focus 
on the output of institutions taken by representatives of international institutions, those 
speakers representing civil society challenged the G8, the EU, and the UN by focusing 
on the more problematic aspects of democratic legitimacy, such as transparency and 
representativeness. In sum, we can observe that the normative benchmarks employed to 
evaluate international institutions significantly vary between their representatives and 
member state governments and other actors. 
Our analysis of external explicit self-legitimation provides a comprehensive picture 
of processes of international legitimation. More research is needed to clarify the mutual 
impact of self-legitimations and evaluations by other actors. How do the two perspecti-
ves within the process of legitimation, top-down and bottom-up, relate to each other and 
how are they interconnected over time? Equally left for future research are the self-
legitimizing activities of international institutions in those fields of our matrix we were 
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not able to refer to in this paper, e.g. by analyzing declarations and artifacts of internati-
onal institutions and interviewing those persons in authority who are responsible for 
self-legitimation strategies.  
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APPENDIX 
Appendix 1: Legitimacy Patterns 
 democracy-based non-democracy-based 
input 
 popular sovereignty participation 
 deliberation 
 transparency 
 accountability 
 legality 
 credibility 
 demos/community 
 (charismatic) leadership 
 expertocratic leadership 
 religious authority 
 traditional processes 
 moderation 
 capability/agency 
 seriousness 
output 
 protection of human rights  
 reversibility 
 democratic empowerment 
 contribution to public good  
 efficacy/effectiveness 
 efficiency 
 distributive justice 
 contribution to stability 
 contribution to identity 
 contribution to morality 
 sovereignty/power 
 good international standing 
 innovation 
 relevancy/good agenda 
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